Energy · Profile from Energy Research Companion
LONGi Green Energy
The Xi'an company that bet in 2000 that solar would run on monocrystalline silicon rather than the cheaper multicrystalline wafers that dominated the industry, drove the cost of mono wafers down with diamond-wire sawing and sheer scale until multi all but disappeared (by ~2020), bought its way into modules with Lerri Solar (2014–15) and became, by 2020–22, the world's largest module shipper (industry rankings, reported). Then the industry it helped build overbuilt: China's polysilicon-to-module capacity ran far ahead of world demand, module prices fell to ~$0.10/Wdc (China export, 2024) and LONGi lost ~CNY 8.6bn in 2024 — its first annual loss in twelve years — then ~CNY 6.4bn in 2025 and ~CNY 3.7bn in H1 2026 (company, reported). Its answer is back-contact (BC) cells; its US story runs from UFLPA detentions (2022–23) and Southeast Asian tariffs to a minority stake in Illuminate USA, a ~5 GW module factory in Ohio. LONGi is the book's case that winning the cost war does not guarantee profits in a glut.
At a glance
- Founded
- Feb 2000, Xi'an, Shaanxi (as Xi'an Xinlong / LONGi Silicon; reported), by Li Zhenguo, Li Xiyan, Zhong Baoshen and partners (reported)
- Headquarters
- Xi'an, China
- Ownership / structure
- Public, Shanghai Stock Exchange: 601012 (listed Apr 2012, reported); founders remain the largest individual holders (Li Zhenguo, Li Xiyan, Zhong Baoshen; verify current stakes)
- Leadership (2026)
- Zhong Baoshen (chairman, verify); Li Zhenguo (founder, president, verify); management changes in 2025–26 not web-checked (verify)
- Assets
- Wafer (ingot pulling and slicing) plants in Shaanxi, Ningxia, Yunnan and Inner Mongolia; cell and module plants in China and Southeast Asia (Malaysia, Vietnam; verify current status after Solar III duties); ~49% of Illuminate USA (Pataskala, Ohio, ~5 GW modules, with Invenergy ~51%) as last widely reported (2024–25) — whether LONGi still holds it after the 2025 FEOC rules is unconfirmed (verify); LONGi Hydrogen (alkaline electrolysers, from 2021)
- Scale
- 2025: revenue ~CNY 70.3bn (~$9.8bn), net loss attributable ~CNY 6.42bn, module shipments ~86.6 GW, wafer shipments ~111.6 GW (company, 28 Apr 2026). H1 2026: revenue ~CNY 27.05bn (−17.6% y/y), net loss ~CNY 3.68bn, modules ~29.9 GW (−24% y/y), BC modules ~19.6 GW (>65% of modules), overseas >65% of module revenue (company, reported Aug–Sep 2026)
- Price benchmarks
- Chinese module export price ~$0.10/Wdc (2024) and ~$0.085–0.095/Wdc Tier-1 TOPCon early 2026 (BNEF via secondary reports, verify); US module prices ~$0.25–0.30/Wdc (2024–25, verify); polysilicon ~CNY 300/kg peak (2022) → ~CNY 35–40/kg (2024, verify)
- Signature moves (incl. failures)
- Founding and the mono bet (2000); Shanghai listing (2012); Lerri Solar and modules (2014–15); the mono-over-multi wafer price war (2016–19); world's largest module maker (2020–22); UFLPA detentions and Southeast Asian tariffs (2022–25); Illuminate USA (2023); the glut and first annual loss (2024); the back-contact bet (2022–26)
9 strategic moves analysed
Each one gets a full strategy file in the companion: context, the decision, the financing, what happened, and the lesson.
2000
Founding and the Monocrystalline Bet
Founding / technology bet
2012
Shanghai Listing
Spin-off or IPO
2015
Lerri Solar and the Move into Modules
Acquisition or merger / vertical integration
2016
Mono Wafer Price Cuts and the Defeat of Multi
Technology bet / pricing strategy
2020
Worlds Largest Module Maker
Construction or commissioning / capacity expansion
2022
UFLPA Detentions and Southeast Asia Tariffs
Regulatory or legal action / trade remedy (failure of a route to market)
2023
Illuminate USA Ohio JV
Joint venture / construction (US manufacturing)
2024
Back Contact HPBC 2 Bet
Technology bet
2024
Polysilicon Glut and First Annual Loss
Restructuring / market collapse (failure)